Paste a record and its inclusion proof, or fetch one by URL. Everything below is recomputed in your browser from the bytes you supply — the hashes, the Merkle path, and the signature on the checkpoint. The checking is entirely local and this node is never asked to confirm any of it; if you use the fetch box, your browser requests that URL and nothing else leaves it.
Nothing yet.
Without a key, the signature check cannot pass.
The hashes and the Merkle path are checked either way. But an unauthenticated checkpoint establishes nothing on its own — anyone can write a root that a matching path folds to. With no key the best verdict this page can reach is amber: partly checked, the record is in a log. The signer’s key is what closes that.
That the content shown is the content that was hashed. The leaf commits to a digest of the record’s payload, and this page checks that the digest beside the record matches the one in the leaf — but a lookup response carries the payload as parsed fields, not as the bytes the digest was taken over, so your browser cannot recompute it. Someone who altered both the content and the digest together would pass this check.
That the log is append-only. An inclusion proof says this record is in the tree the checkpoint describes; it says nothing about whether that tree is an extension of the one the node published yesterday. Only a party who kept yesterday's checkpoint can establish that, which is what the ring is for, and what the evidence page shows in full.